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Abstract This special issue focuses on empirical and
theoretical papers that help us to better understand the
strategy and governance of entrepreneurial networks, such
as franchise chains, alliances, and cooperative networks.
The following central themes are covered: (I) Which for-
mal governance mechanisms do entrepreneurial networks
use in order to reduce transaction cost/agency cost and to
increase strategic value? (II) What is the role of relational
governance mechanisms (such as information exchange
and social ties) for the performance outcomes in franchise
chains and cooperatives? (III) Which alliance strategies do
entrepreneurial firms pursue to realize a competitive ad-
vantage, and what is the impact of resources and capabil-
ities on performance outcomes of entrepreneurial firms. To
address these issues, insights from organizational econom-
ics (transaction cost theory, agency theory, signaling theo-
ry), strategic management perspectives (resource-based,
knowledge-based and organizational capabilities theory),
entrepreneurship theory and the relational governance
view are used.
Keywords Entrepreneurial networks . Franchise
networks . Cooperatives . Alliances . Formal
governance . Relational governance . Strategies .
Organizational capabilities
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Entrepreneurial networks, such as franchise networks,
cooperatives, retail chains, and alliances (e. g., Gulati
2007; Baker et al. 2008; Goyal 2015; Snow 2015;
Windsperger et al. 2015; Buckley and Prashantham
2016; Koch and Windsperger 2017), are important gov-
ernance modes that enable entrepreneurial firms to
achieve superior performance by collaborating with oth-
er firms over a specific range of value chain activities
(Miles et al. 2005, 2006). As entrepreneurial firms with
weak market and resource positions (Katila et al. 2012),
they govern their collaborations by using contractual
and equity relations. Entrepreneurial networks enable
them to improve their competitive position by exploring
and exploiting new knowledge (Alvarez and Barney
2001; Lavie 2006; Hayter 2015). Therefore, these firms
use entrepreneurial networks to complement their re-
sources and capabilities in order to realize static and
dynamic efficiency advantages.
This special issue focuses on empirical and theoreti-
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and governance of entrepreneurial networks. In particu-
lar, the studies address the following themes:
First, which formal governance mechanisms do fran-
chise networks use for transaction cost/agency cost
savings and strategic value creation? Formal gover-
nance mechanisms refer to the structure of decision
and ownership rights and the contract design. Insights
from organizational economics (transaction cost the-
ory, agency theory (e.g.,Williamson 1991; Lafontaine
1992) and strategic management perspectives
(organizational capability theory, e.g., Teece et al.
1997; Helfat et al. 2007) are used to investigate the
following themes: antecedents of franchise contract
termination, franchising proportion and network fail-
ure, and organizational capabilities as determinants of
multi-unit franchising.
Second, what is the role of relational governance
mechanisms (such as information disclosure, signal-
ing and social ties) for the performance in franchise
networks and cooperatives? Applying insights from
organizational economics (transaction cost theory,
signaling theory, e.g., Gallini and Lutz 1992;
Spence 2002) and the relational governance view
(e.g., Dyer 1997; Dyer and Singh 1998) the papers
focus on the following issues: quality signaling and
voluntary information disclosure in franchising and
the value of pooling in cooperative entrepreneurial
networks (Liang and Hendrikse 2016).
Third, which alliance strategies do entrepreneurial
firms (such as franchisee firms and spin-offs) pursue
to realize a competitive advantage, and what is the
impact of resources and capabilities on performance
of entrepreneurial firms?
Research results based on insights from resource-
based, knowledge-based and organizational capabili-
ties theories (e.g., Barney 1991; Teece et al. 1997; Das
and Teng 2000; Alvarez and Barney 2001; Lavie
2006; Teece 2014; Scholten et al. 2015) and entrepre-
neurship theory (e.g., Hébert and Link 1989;
Audretsch 2012; Carlsson et al. 2013; Hayter 2015)
are used to address the following issues: peer net-
working strategy and franchisee performance, alliance
strategy and innovation performance of spin-off firms,
impact of network and managerial capabilities on the
performance of entrepreneurial firms, and the role of
partner resources in strategic equity alliances for
smaller entrepreneurial firm compared to larger firms.
The papers contained in this special issue were first
presented at the seventh international conference on
Economics andManagement of Networks (EMNet) that
took place at the Faculty of Economic and Management
Sciences (EMS) at the University of the Western Cape
from December 3–5, 2015, Cape Town, South Africa.
The aim of the conference was to provide an interna-
tional discussion forum for research in economics and
management of entrepreneurial networks.
The special issue is structured in four parts (see
Table 1).
1 Formal governance issues in entrepreneurial
networks
López-Fernández and López-Bayón examine the ante-
cedents of contract terminations in franchising from the
franchisor and franchisee perspective. Franchise
Table 1 Overview: governance and strategy of entrepreneurial networks
Topics Authors
Formal governance issues Antecedents of franchise contract termination
Franchising proportion and network failure
Organizational capabilities and multi-unit franchising
López-Fernández and López-Bayón
(2017)
Madanoglu and Castrogiovanni (2017)
Hussain et al. (2017)
Relational governance issues Information disclosure and signaling in franchising
Pooling and social ties in cooperative entrepreneurial
networks
Sadeh and Kacker (2017)
Deng and Hendrikse (2017)
Strategy, resources, and
capabilities
Alliance strategy and performance of spin-offs
Peer networking strategy and franchisee performance
Performance effect of network andmanagerial capabilities
in entrepreneurial firms
Role of partner resources in strategic equity alliances
Hagedoorn et al. (2017)
Brand and Croonen (2017)
Srećković (2017)
Belgraver and Verwaal (2017)
J. Windsperger et al.
networks face the challenge of achieving consistency for
the entire franchise system while assuring some auton-
omy for individual franchisees as local entrepreneurs in
their ventures. This complex balance constitutes a
source of conflict that may lead to termination of the
franchise relationship. Franchisors therefore have to
decide on the level of empowerment of their franchisees
and on different contract provisions to leverage franchi-
sees’ capabilities and manage sustainable relationships.
Based on data from Spanish franchise chains, this study
shows that both parties may have different reactions to
the allocation of decision rights. Specifically, the authors
focus on pricing and local advertising policies as con-
troversial issues and analyze how decentralizing them is
related positively or negatively to contract terminations.
Madanoglu and Castrogiovanni investigate the rela-
tionship between franchising proportion of a network
and firm failure. Drawing from resource scarcity and
agency theories, the authors show that franchising firms
that over-franchise and do not structure their networks in
congruence with these two theories have lower survival
prospects. Firms will franchise to the extent that it
offsets resource scarcities and agency costs. As franchis-
ing proportion increases to the point warranted by those
resource and agency concerns, the likelihood of failure
will diminish. However, under an optimal level of fran-
chising for each firm, it is expected that firm failure will
increase when the franchising proportion increases be-
yond the optimum. Madanoglu and Castrogiovanni test
the hypothesis with extensive data from nearly 5000
franchising firms listed in Entrepreneur magazine. The
main findings suggest that franchising proportion has a
U-shape relationship with network failure. Lower levels
of franchising proportion are negatively related to firm
failure and, at high levels of franchising, firms tend to be
more likely to fail. For franchisors, the results highlight
the importance of maintaining an appropriate mix of
franchised and company-owned outlets within a
network.
The franchisor can expand the entrepreneurial net-
work by using single-unit or multi-unit franchising
(MUF). Under MUF, a franchisee as local entrepreneur
owns two or more outlets in the same franchise chain.
Previous research on multi-unit franchising has primar-
ily focused on agency and transaction cost perspectives.
Franchisors choose local entrepreneurs as owner of a
mini-chain to reduce coordination and monitoring costs.
The study ofHussain, Sreckovic and Windsperger com-
plements these organizational economics explanation
by developing an organizational capability (OC) model
of the franchisor’s choice of MUF. According to the OC
view, the franchisor can gain a competitive advantage by
efficient exploration and exploitation of firm-specific
resources and capabilities. The franchise system’s ex-
ploitation capabilities include knowledge transfer capa-
bilities, human resources management capabilities and
monitoring capabilities, and exploration capabilities re-
fer to capabilities regarding the development of new
business processes and organizational routines, skills,
products, and services. It is hypothesized that, if the
franchisor expects to obtain a competitive advantage
from higher exploration and exploitation capabilities
when using MUF as opposed to single-unit franchising,
the franchisor will choose a multi-unit ownership strat-
egy in the franchise system. Based on data from the 167
German and Swiss franchise networks the findings
show a positive impact of the franchise system’s orga-
nizational capabilities (exploration and exploitation ca-
pabilities) on the franchisor’s choice of the multi-unit
ownership strategy.
2 Relational governance issues in entrepreneurial
networks
When prospective franchisees consider buying franchis-
ing rights from a franchisor, they are likely to be inter-
ested in knowing how much money an average franchi-
see can make in that chain. It is possible that franchisee
dissatisfaction with unmet expectations can be traced to
incomplete information available to prospective franchi-
sees about the quality of the franchisor—this reflects the
classical adverse selection problem in agency theory.
Since there is no precise way to measure or guarantee
future outcomes for new franchisees, franchisors may
decide to voluntarily disclose some information about
their current outlets’ financial performance to signal the
quality of their business concept. Sadeh and Kacker
examine antecedents of voluntary information disclo-
sures for standardized contracts in entrepreneurial net-
works using the context of franchising. Entrepreneurs
(e.g., franchisors) may make such disclosures to pro-
spective business partners in order to signal profitability
of partnering, attract financial and managerial resources,
and develop their entrepreneurial networks. The authors
draw on signaling theory to develop a theoretical frame-
work and investigate factors that influence a franchisor’s
disclosure decision. Based onmulti-sector panel data for
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the U.S. franchising industry, the results support the
view that franchise firms signal their quality through
financial performance representations to attract potential
business partners and expand their entrepreneurial net-
works. The study contributes to the entrepreneurship
literature by exploring the quality signaling role of vol-
untary information disclosure in business-to-business
context.
Deng and Hendrikse investigate the value of pooling
in cooperative entrepreneurial networks. A cooperative
is an enterprise owned by a network of entrepreneurial
members. For instance in agricultural cooperatives, this
entrepreneurial network is formed to advance their
member’s economic interests by bringing the following
benefits: economies of size, elimination of double mar-
ginalization, profits from processing, assurance of prod-
uct outlet, gains from vertical and horizontal coordina-
tion, risk reduction, countervailing power, competitive
yardstick effect, and auxiliary services for members.
Deng and Hendrikse address the question why do co-
operatives often pay a pooled price, despite the free-
riding incentives it entails? In a pooling arrangement, all
network members receive the same price for the deliv-
ered quantity of inputs. The local nature of cooperative
membership entails that the members as entrepreneurs
are likely to know each other and have social ties. By
taking explicitly into account the social interactions
among entrepreneurial members and the impact of so-
cial ties on members’ product quality provisions, the
authors identify the circumstances when pooling is effi-
cient. It is shown that social interactions mitigate the
free-riding effect of pooling and that the amount of
members’ social interactions depends upon, and in-
creases with, the cooperative’s level of pooling. The
authors argue that the survival of cooperatives as an
entrepreneurial network pursuing a pooling strategy
may strongly depend on the intensity of local market
interactions related to the exchange of specific knowl-
edge. For instance, if the knowledge exchange is based
on explicit contracts and does not require social interac-
tions between the firms, the pooling policy is sub-
optimal.
3 Strategy, resources, and capabilities
of entrepreneurial firms
Despite the wide recognition of alliances as major vehi-
cle for knowledge transfer and access to other firms’
knowledge-based resources and capabilities, prior re-
search gave limited attention to whether and how for-
mation of alliances affect the performance of spin-offs,
as a specific group of entrepreneurial firms. In their
study, Hagedoorn, Lokshin, and Malo examine the im-
pact of alliance strategy on the innovation performance
of spin-offs firm, differentiating between spin-offs from
either other firms or from public research organizations.
In particular, the questions are analyzed to what extent
alliances of spin-offs with other firms (either large or
small andmedium sized firms) do affect their innovation
performance and how this performance may be affected
by their corporate or public research background. Based
on data from the combinatorial chemistry industry, the
authors find evidence that in general alliances of spin-
offs with other firms, in particular alliances with large
firms, increased their innovation performance. Corpo-
rate spin-offs that formed alliances with other firms
outperformed public research spin-offs with such alli-
ances. This suggests that, in terms of their innovation
performance, corporate spin-offs that engaged in alli-
ances with other firms seemed to have benefitted from
their prior corporate background. It turns out that the
negative impact of alliances on the innovation perfor-
mance of public research spin-offs was largely affected
by their alliances with small and medium sized firms.
Therefore, the analysis of alliance strategies of spin-offs
shows that the consequences of the choice of alliance
partner for a spin-off’s innovation performance depend
on its background (i.e., corporate as opposed to univer-
sity or public research).
Recent studies have called for a better understanding
of the link between networking and entrepreneurial
performance. Brand and Croonen combine knowledge
and learning perspectives with a networking perspective
to develop and test a multi-faceted framework on the
effects of franchisee peer networking strategy within a
franchise system on franchisee unit performance. In
particular, it is argued that the performance benefits that
franchisees draw from networking with their peers vary
between low, medium, and high performing franchisees.
Based on data from a Dutch franchise system, the results
confirm that structural, resource and relational facets of
franchisee peer networking affect unit performance, and
that they benefit and harm low, medium, and high
performing franchisees differently. Specifically, the au-
thors show that high performers will benefit from a
strong network position and peer operational quality,
while they suffer from having network relationships
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with peers with high sales quality and frequent commu-
nication. For medium performers, only a strong network
position will improve sales performance, and too much
communication will come at the cost of decreasing
sales. For the low performers, having peer relationships
with high sales performers will help to improve franchi-
see unit performance. Overall, the authors conclude that
what may be a blessing for one group of franchisee
entrepreneurs is a curse for some others.
Building on the organizational capabilities view,
Sreckovic explores the impact of network and manage-
rial capabilities on the performance of entrepreneurial
firms in the architecture and real estate sector. The
author applies an extended organizational capabilities
model by integrating Porter’s value chain model and
Grant’s hierarchy of organizational capabilities model.
Starting from differences in entrepreneurial orientation
between architecture and real estate development firms
the author argues that, in uncertain dynamic environ-
ments, network capabilities compared to managerial
capabilities are more important for firm performance in
architecture firms than in real estate development firms.
This may be due to the fact that architects as smaller
entrepreneurial firms are much more dependent on rep-
utation and network relationships. They need to initiate
and maintain close relationships with their clients in
order to acquire new projects and remain competitive
in highly uncertain markets. Employing data from Aus-
tria, Germany and Switzerland, the research results sup-
port the hypotheses. This study contributes to the stra-
tegic entrepreneurship literature by showing that net-
work capabilities are more important for creating com-
petitive advantage in entrepreneurial firms than in other
firms.
Access to complementary resources through strategic
equity alliance networks is an important activity for both
smaller entrepreneurial firms and larger firms. The study
of Belgraver and Verwaal explores the role of partner
resources in strategic equity alliances for smaller entre-
preneurial firms and larger firms. In the economics and
management literature, it is often assumed that in alli-
ances with larger firms, smaller firms face more chal-
lenges in integrating knowledge than their larger coun-
terparts and are more sensitive to hold-up in alliances
due to higher specific investments. Specifically, the
authors argue that the attributes of partner organizational
capital are negative related, and the attributes of partner
production factor resources are positive related to the
smaller firm financial performance. By applying a
longitudinal analysis to a dataset of 1730 firm-year
observations of strategic equity alliances in the software
industry in 25 countries over an 11-year period, the
results show that smaller firms in strategic equity alli-
ances are less able to integrate the organizational capa-
bilities of larger firms, because smaller firms and the
organizational and structural properties that come with
smaller size may hamper the capacity to absorb the
partner’s organizational capital. On the other hand,
smaller firms benefit more from production factor re-
sources compared to larger partner firms. Overall, the
findings indicate that entrepreneurial networks provide
important opportunities as well as threats for the smaller
entrepreneurial firms.
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